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INTRODUCTION
At its Tenth National Party Conference in 2016, Tunisia’s Ennahda Party
announced that it would be formally rejecting the label “political Islam” and

†
In this Article, I employ a number of Arabic- and French-language sources. All translations into English
are my own. To transliterate Arabic words into English, I generally follow the guidelines provided by the
International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES Translation and Transliteration Guide, CAMBRIDGE UNIV.
PRESS
(2021),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-middle-east-studies/information/
author-resources/ijmes-translation-and-transliteration-guide (last visited Apr. 6, 2022)). However, given the
predominance of French in Tunisia, the everyday spelling of many Tunisian names reflects French transliteration
conventions (e.g., “Rached Ghannouchi” instead of “Rashid Ghannushi”). Moreover, for well-known names, I
tend to opt for the spellings that are most commonly used in media and publications (e.g., “Ennahda” instead of
“al-Nahdha”).
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rebranding itself as a party of “Muslim democrats.”1 As part of this new identity,
Ennahda decided to specialize exclusively in political affairs, officially
separating religious activism from the party after decades of pursuing both
politics and preaching.2 This announcement fueled speculation about Ennahda’s
motivations, the decision’s practical implications, and its consequences for the
relationship between religion and politics in Tunisia, which was only a few years
into its democratic transition at the time.3
One thinker whose work can provide insight into Ennahda’s rebranding is
Abdullahi An-Na’im, a leading scholar of Islam, human rights, and
constitutionalism.4 In his 2008 book Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating
the Future of Shari’a, An-Na’im outlines a normative framework for relating
Islam, the state, and politics with the goal of equipping Muslims with the tools
and space to negotiate “the role of Islam in public life.”5 Writing before the Arab
Spring, An-Na’im did not have the opportunity to include post-revolution
Tunisia as a case study. However, many of the core themes in his book—such
as constitutionalism, human rights, and the public place of religion—have
emerged as primary topics of debate in Tunisia’s democratic transition since
2011, resulting in an opportunity to assess how his ideas have played out in this
context.
This Article evaluates the extent to which An-Na’im’s proposals have
achieved their desired objectives in post-revolution Tunisia by analyzing the
case of Ennahda’s 2016 rebranding. Specifically, I ask the following question:
to what extent does Ennahda’s rebranding as a “Muslim democratic” party
reflect—and contribute to—a constructive mediation of the relationship between
Islam, the state, and politics in the Tunisian context? In my analysis, I illustrate
the implications of An-Na’im’s framework for “Islamist politics,” a subject on
which Islam and the Secular State is relatively silent. Ultimately, I argue that
while Ennahda’s experience affirms the ability of An-Na’im’s normative
principles to moderate “Islamist politics” and promote culturally legitimate

1
Ennahda, al-Bayān al-Khitāmī li-l-Mu’tamar al-’Āmm al-’Āshir li-Harakat al-Nahdha (2016),
https://web.archive.org/web/20210415085641/http://congres10.ennahdha.tn/ar/-ﺍﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮ-ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ-ﻟﻠﻤﺆﺗﻤﺮ-ﺍﻟﺨﺘﺎﻣﻲ-ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺎﻥ
ﺍﻟﻨﻬﻀﺔ-ﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ.
2
Id.
3
Sarah Souli, What is Left of Tunisia’s Ennahda Party?, AL JAZEERA (May 27, 2016),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/5/27/what-is-left-of-tunisias-ennahda-party; Melek Saral, The Protection
of Human Rights in Transitional Tunisia, 16 MUSLIM WORLD J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2019).
4
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Meet Abdullahi An-Na’im, SCHOLARBLOGS (2015) [hereinafter Meet
Abdullahi An-Na’im], https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/aannaim/about.
5
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF
SHARI’A 293 (2008) [hereinafter ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE].
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reform, it also highlights a tension between An-Na’im’s requirements of cultural
legitimacy and civic reason that presents a potential pitfall for Islamist political
actors.
A. Sources and Scope
To outline Ennahda’s vision and strategy, I rely primarily on official party
publications from Ennahda’s website and Facebook page, in addition to
published interviews with and statements from party members. As public
rhetoric, these sources reflect Ennahda’s desired public image and may not fully
reveal the party’s internal dynamics or true intentions. However, because I seek
to understand Ennahda’s decision to rebrand (i.e., an effort to alter the
organization’s outward image), it is paramount to evaluate how the party
publicly communicated this decision, in its own words. In addition, because this
Article focuses on the content of Ennahda’s 2016 conference, the scope of my
analysis is limited to the period between 1956 (the year Tunisia achieved
independence) and 2016.
B. An-Na’im and His Work
Abdullahi An-Na’im’s writing is motivated by two desires. First, An-Na’im
had the desire to promote a “liberal modernist” conception of Islam and the
“cultural legitimacy and practical efficacy of international human rights norms.”
Second, he wanted to use scholarship in service of “positive social change”
around constitutionalism and human rights in Muslim-majority societies.6 AnNa’im emphasizes how these ambitions are informed by his personal
experiences with state repression.7 As a university student in his native Sudan,
he joined an Islamic reform movement led by Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, a
scholar who advocated a historically contextual reading of the Qur’an and
sunna.8 In the 1980s, Sudan’s authoritarian regime persecuted Taha’s
movement, executing Taha in 1985 after he protested the state’s imposition of
shari’a.9 After leaving Sudan, An-Na’im employed Taha’s reform methodology
in his own scholarship to develop an understanding of shari’a10 consistent with
6

Meet Abdullahi An-Na’im, supra note 5.
Id.
8
Id.
9
George Packer, The Moderate Martyr, NEW YORKER (Sept. 3, 2006), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2006/09/11/the-moderate-martyr.
10
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 6, at 3. An-Na’im defines shari’a as “the religious law of
Islam,” which is “derived from human interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna.” Id. Because methods of
interpreting the Qur’an and sunna can vary, the normative content of shari’a “can change over time.” Id. This
“constant process” of “elaborati[ng] and specifyi[ng]” the content of shari’a is what An-Na’im means when he
7
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constitutionalism and international human rights norms.11 This methodology has
given him a “distinctive reformist approach to Islamic law”12 and a “very
specific position in the debate over secularism, human rights, and Islamic
reform.”13
An-Na’im’s book Islam and the Secular State addresses the relationship
between a modernist understanding of shari’a and the state, epitomizing his
unique ideas. An-Na’im introduces the book as the “culmination of [his] life’s
work” and the “final statement” he wishes to make on the subject.14 The book
presents an “Islamic argument for a secular state” by offering a normative
theoretical framework that aims to promote “the most conducive conditions” for
negotiating “the future of Shari’a in the public domain.”15
An-Na’im’s framework consists of three components: the religious
neutrality of the state, the connection of religion and politics, and the distinction
between the state and politics. He defines the religious neutrality of the state as
“the institutional separation of Islam and the state,” meaning that the state should
not use its coercive powers to enforce shari’a as state law.16 This institutional
separation does not mean the complete privatization of religion, such as that
mandated by the strict French-style secularism known as laïcité. Rather, AnNa’im imagines a robust public role for religion, maintaining a connection
between Islam and politics that allows Islamic values to inform public policy
and legislation.17 Further, An-Na’im envisions a series of buffers—including
principles like representative government and the rule of law—between the state
and politics that allow the state to reflect political realities while preventing the
state from being dominated by a single interest group.18
An-Na’im admits that sustaining the separation of Islam and the state despite
the connectedness of Islam and politics constitutes a “paradox” that lacks a

says “negotiating the future of Shari’a.” Id.
11
See generally ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAʻIM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990) [hereinafter TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION]
(identifying areas of conflict between shari’a, modern constitutionalism, and human rights norms, and calling
for reforms of shari’a to resolve them).
12
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the Secular State by Abdullahi An-Na’im, 50 J. CHURCH & STATE
721, 721 (2008) (book review).
13
Andrew F. March, Islam and the Secular State by Abdullahi An-Na’im, 79 J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. 258,
259 (2011) (book review).
14
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 6, at vii; Meet Abdullahi An-Na’im, supra note 5.
15
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 6, at vii–viii.
16
Id. at 4.
17
Id. at 270, 278.
18
Id. at 268, 270.
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“permanent resolution.”19 Rather, sustaining this separation necessitates
constant mediation.20 He proposes certain mechanisms to facilitate this
mediation, namely constitutionalism, human rights, citizenship, and “civic
reason,” which refers to the use of “open and accessible” argumentation—rather
than dogmatic religious claims—to advance policy and legislation in the public
sphere.21 Above all, An-Na’im emphasizes the importance of employing cultural
legitimacy for social change.22
Finally, while his argument for a secular state rests on the normative
principles above, An-Na’im stresses that his proposal is not intended to be overly
prescriptive. His goal in Islam in the Secular State is to identify the set of
conditions that will best allow Muslims to freely negotiate the “public role of
Islam” in their societies; however, once these conditions are in place, the process
of negotiation and its outcome will necessarily look different in each societal
context.23
C. Engaging with An-Na’im
Islam and the Secular State has prompted a number of constructive
criticisms and clarifying questions from reviewers. For instance, several
reviewers point out that An-Na’im analyzes India, Turkey, and Indonesia rather
than examining any case studies from the Arab world.24 This omission was likely
intentional; in a 2006 interview, An-Na’im opined that the “periphery” of the
Muslim world held greater promise for developing a “sophisticated” approach
to religion and politics than the Arab heartland.25 However, the ongoing
uprisings that began in 2011 in Arab countries—which have implicated the
relationship between Islam, politics, and the state—make An-Na’im’s omission
more glaring today.
Other reviewers lament the book’s ambiguous treatment of the relationship
between religion and politics. Mayer wonders whether an “Islamic secular state”
is not a “contradiction in terms,” noting that An-Na’im does not sufficiently
clarify how an “enhanced political role for Islam” can function in a secular

19

Id. at 28.
Id.
21
Id. at 279.
22
Id. at 257, 277–79.
23
Id. at 292.
24
Mark D. Welton, Islam and the Secular State by Abdullahi An-Na’im, 62 MIDDLE E. J. 727 (2008)
(book review); March, supra note 14, at 260.
25
Packer, supra note 10.
20
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system.26 El Amine identifies a similar tension regarding the role of civic reason,
asking: “If ‘civic reason’ is to prevail in the public sphere, and ‘civic reason’
rejects religious arguments, then can specifically religious arguments make any
contribution at all to the domain of politics and public policy?”27
Still, other reviewers maintain that An-Na’im’s vision cannot realistically be
implemented into practice. Fadel, for example, suggests that orthodox Muslims
will find An-Na’im’s reformist approach to shari’a unpersuasive.28 Bamyeh
notes that many Muslims may remain wary of a secular state, given their
negative experiences with state secularism under colonial and postcolonial
regimes.29 Meanwhile, White observes that An-Na’im’s vision fails to provide
any mechanisms for its implementation besides “good will, morality, and
reason,” which may not suffice in authoritarian systems where “struggle and
opposition” are required to create change.30
An-Na’im is clear that Islam and the Secular State is not intended to be a
blueprint for reform but rather a catalyst for conversation. Accordingly, the
questions and criticisms discussed above provide a starting point to continue the
conversation in this Article, identifying ambiguities in An-Na’im’s theory that
can be clarified in the Tunisian context.
D. Contribution to the Literature
Tunisia provides an ideal case study for Islam and the Secular State. First, it
is generally considered the most successful democratic transition to emerge from
the Arab Spring.31 Moreover, in both the leadup to and aftermath of Tunisia’s
2011 revolution, Tunisian politics and civil society were intensely preoccupied
with questions of constitutionalism, human rights, and the public role of Islam.32
Furthermore, the immediate pre- and post-revolution eras witnessed an
unusually high degree of collaboration between religious and secular political
actors.33 Tunisia’s 2014 constitution embodies these compromises—it is an
26

Mayer, supra note 13, at 722.
Loubna El Amine, Islam and the Secular State by Abdullahi An-Na’im, 41 INT’L. J. MIDDLE E. STUD.
479, 480 (2009) (book review).
28
Mohammad Fadel, Islamic Politics and Secular Politics: Can They Co-Exist?, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 187,
201 (2009).
29
Mohammed Bamyeh, A Secular State Must Deliver, IMMANENT FRAME (June 20, 2008), https://tif.ssrc.
org/2008/06/20/a-secular-state-must-deliver.
30
Jenny White, Does Tolerance Require Struggle?, IMMANENT FRAME (July 21, 2008), https://tif.ssrc.
org/2008/07/21/does-tolerance-require-struggle.
31
SAFWAN M. MASRI, TUNISIA: AN ARAB ANOMALY xxv (2017).
32
See Saral, supra note 4.
33
See id.
27
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essentially secular document that affirms the country’s Muslim identity but
makes no reference to shari’a as a source of law.34
This Article focuses on Ennahda in particular because of the unique role it
played in Tunisia’s democratic transition. As the largest party in Tunisia’s first
post-revolution legislature, Ennahda took the lead in formulating the country’s
2014 constitution, marking the first time that a credibly elected “Islamic” party
had led a constitutional drafting process.35 Moreover, since the movement’s
founding in the 1960s, Ennahda has striven to articulate how Islam, the state,
and politics should be connected in Tunisia. Its 2016 rebranding as a “Muslim
democratic” party represents the latest articulation of this evolving vision, one
that accepts and endorses the secular state framework established by the 2014
constitution. For these reasons, Ennahda holds particular relevance to the ideas
discussed in Islam and the Secular State.
I.

MUSLIM DEMOCRACY AND ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE

A. Unpacking “Islamism”
Ennahda is often characterized as an “Islamist” movement or a manifestation
of “political Islam,” terms that broadly describe a range of phenomena—whether
ideologies, movements, or political parties—that seek to use state power to
establish a version of “Islamic order” in society.36 The origins of “Islamism” are
usually traced back to the ideology of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, particularly
the writings of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.37
However, these terms and their derivatives often obscure more than they
clarify and evoke problematic tropes. For instance, there is a prevailing tendency
to subsume various “religiously-inspired trends” under the label “Islamism”
without regard for the differences among them.38 Furthermore, discussions about
“political Islam” often perpetuate the notion that Islam is “not a religion but a

34
MAZEN SHAQOURA & ANNALI KRISTIANSEN, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DEBATE IN TUNISIA (Sept. 2015), https://www.humanrights.dk/publications/islam-human-rights-constitutionaldebate-tunisia.
35
Duncan Pickard, Al-Nahda: Moderation and Compromise in Tunisia’s Constitutional Bargain, in
POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITIONS IN NORTH AFRICA: ACTORS AND FACTORS 27 (Justin Orlando
Frosini & Francesco Biagi eds., 2015).
36
Asef Bayat, The Arab Spring and Its Surprises, 44 DEV. CHANGE 587, 592 (2013); JEFFRY R.
HALVERSON & NATHANIEL GREENBERG, ISLAMISTS OF THE MAGHREB 5–6 (2018).
37
HAZEM KANDIL, INSIDE THE BROTHERHOOD 1 (2015); HALVERSON & GREENBERG, supra note 37, at
4–5.
38
Bayat, supra note 37, at 592.
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political ideology,” ignoring the fact that religion in nearly every human society
is intertwined with law, politics, and public life.39 For this reason, Achcar argues
that the term “Islamism” is Orientalist in its implication that the phenomenon in
question is somehow “specific to Islam.”40 Because of these pitfalls, I only
employ the terms “Islamism” and “political Islam” when they are used in the
sources I engage with, and in each case, I clarify the author’s definition and use
of the terms.
B. Ennahda’s History and Ideological Evolution
The organization now known as Ennahda originated under the authoritarian
regime of Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia’s first postcolonial president. After Tunisia
gained independence from France in 1956, Bourguiba moved aggressively to
“modernize” Tunisia in a European-inspired manner, initiating several reforms.
First, he imposed a laïcité-style secularism that curtailed public expressions of
religion.41 This involved dismantling traditional religious institutions like the
shari’a courts and discouraging religious rituals like fasting during Ramadan.42
Bourguiba also sought to advance gender equality, instituting a Personal Status
Code that protected women’s rights and outlawed polygamy.43 Finally,
Bourguiba made French, rather than Arabic, the primary language for school
instruction and public administration.44
Bourguiba’s policies rankled some Tunisians, who viewed his
modernization attempts as another iteration of colonialism.45 Meanwhile, a
“social periphery” of Tunisians in rural and semi-rural areas saw dwindling
prospects for economic advancement within an increasingly urban, secular, and
Francophone elite.46 These conditions prompted three young men—Rached
Ghannouchi, Abdelfatah Mourou, and Hmida Ennaifer—to found al-Jama’a alIslamiyya (“the Islamic Group”) in the late 1960s.47 They initially created the
organization as a da’wa (preaching and proselytization) movement to
39

HALVERSON & GREENBERG, supra note 37, at 2–3.
GILBERT ACHCAR, MARXISM, ORIENTALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM 64–65 (2013).
41
MICHAEL J. WILLIS, POLITICS AND POWER IN THE MAGHREB: ALGERIA, TUNISIA AND MOROCCO FROM
INDEPENDENCE TO THE ARAB SPRING 58 (2014); Alfred Stepan, Multiple but Complementary, Not Conflictual,
Leaderships: The Tunisian Democratic Transition in Comparative Perspective, 3 DAEDALUS J. AM. ACAD. ARTS
& SCI. 95 (2016).
42
ANNE WOLF, POLITICAL ISLAM IN TUNISIA: THE HISTORY OF ENNAHDA 101 (2017).
43
Id. at 28–29.
44
AZZAM TAMIMI, RACHID GHANNOUCHI: A DEMOCRAT WITHIN ISLAMISM 13 (2001).
45
HALVERSON & GREENBERG, supra note 37, at 71.
46
Abdelkader Zghal, The New Strategy of the Movement of the Islamic Way: Manipulation or Expression
of Political Culture?, in TUNISIA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM 205 (Ira William Zartman ed., 1991).
47
HAMZA MEDDEB, ENNAHDA’S UNEASY EXIT FROM POLITICAL ISLAM 3 (2019).
40
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reinvigorate Islamic piety in the public sphere in response to Bourguiba’s
secularism, the rise of the far left, and the outdated preaching of Tunisia’s
religious establishment.48 The Islamic Group borrowed its early structural model
from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and expanded rapidly throughout the
1960s and 1970s, drawing much of its base from the social periphery.49
Throughout the 1970s, the group grew increasingly political—a change that
Wolf attributes to three factors.50 The first factor was an influx of literature from
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which became popular among the group’s
grassroots.51 Second, there was a highly politicized environment on university
campuses, where debates between religious activists and their leftist classmates
pushed the university branch of the Islamic Group to adopt a much more
political—and explicitly anti-Bourguiba—stance.52 Third, there was the 1979
Iranian Revolution, which solidified the group’s shift toward political activism
by convincing its leadership that Islam could serve as a framework for
addressing the socioeconomic issues typically championed by leftists.53 In July
1979, the group changed its name to Harakat al-Ittijāh al-Islāmi (the Islamic
Tendency Movement, referred to by its French acronym, “MTI”), a rebranding
that signaled its commitment to both preaching and political activism.54
Until this point, Bourguiba had tolerated—and perhaps tacitly encouraged—
the underground growth of the Islamic movement as a counterweight to the far
left, which he considered a greater threat.55 However, the regime’s escalating
repression of leftists in the late 1970s bolstered the MTI as an alternative
opposition force.56 When Bourguiba finally grasped the scope and strength of
his Islamic opposition, he outlawed the MTI and imprisoned hundreds of its
members.57 The MTI briefly entered formal politics when President Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali—who usurped Bourguiba in 1987—endorsed multiparty
politics and released all MTI prisoners.58 The MTI then changed its name to
Harakat Ennahda (“the Renaissance Movement”) and ran candidates in the 1989

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

WOLF, supra note 43, at 34.
Id.; MEDDEB, supra note 48, at 4.
WOLF, supra note 43, at 8.
Id.
Id.
TAMIMI, supra note 45, at 45–46; WOLF, supra note 43, at 8.
WOLF, supra note 43; MEDDEB, supra note 48.
WOLF, supra note 43, at 39.
TAMIMI, supra note 45, at 90.
WOLF, supra note 43, at 57.
Id. at 66–67.
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elections.59 However, after witnessing Ennahda’s electoral success, Ben Ali—
like his predecessor—cracked down on the party, jailing its members and forcing
its leaders into exile.60
During this period of repression, Ennahda’s leadership debated issues such
as the movement’s stance on democracy, its connection to the political left, the
relationship between its sociocultural activism and its political activism, and the
choice whether to work within or against the political system.61 By the turn of
the millennium, Ennahda’s leadership had become convinced that political
activism—and collaborating with other opposition forces—presented the only
path for Ennahda’s survival because Ben Ali’s regime had prohibited it from
preaching.62 Ennahda activists began working with other secular and leftist
dissidents in exile to produce joint anti-regime statements such as the Call of
Tunis Agreement of 2003 and the 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms
in 2005.63 These statements explicitly called for human rights, constitutional
democracy, and a secular state; by signing these documents, Ennahda’s leaders
signaled their endorsement of these principles.64
In January 2011, Ben Ali was ousted by a popular revolution.65 The uprising
in Tunisia, which protested economic frustration and political repression, was
spearheaded by established secular and leftist actors such as the Union Générale
Tunisienne du Travail (“UGTT”), Tunisia’s largest labor union.66 Despite this,
Ennahda’s religious message proved surprisingly popular in the revolution’s
aftermath, a phenomenon that reflected the uptick in religiosity among Tunisians
during the 2000s and the credibility Ennahda had gained as an opposition force
during the party’s period of repression.67
Ben Ali’s ouster allowed Ennahda members to return from exile and
reconstruct the organization’s political apparatus. In Tunisia’s first postrevolution elections, Ennahda came in first with thirty-seven percent of the vote,
dominating the fragmented secular parties.68 It thus became the most powerful
force in the National Constituent Assembly (“NCA”), the legislative body tasked
59

Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 71, 77.
61
Id. at 75; MEDDEB, supra note 48, at 5.
62
MEDDEB, supra note 48, at 6.
63
WOLF, supra note 43, at 133.
64
Mohamed Khalfaoui, Tunisia: Human Rights Organizations, Political Islam and Its Groups, ARAB
REFORM INITIAT. 7 (2018).
65
MASRI, supra note 32, at 1.
66
Id. at 15.
67
WOLF, supra note 43, at 108.
68
Id. at 2.
60
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with formulating Tunisia’s new constitution, in which Ennahda led a coalition
government—nicknamed the “Troika”—alongside a centrist party and a
socialist party.69
Despite its leading position in the NCA, Ennahda struggled to gain the trust
of secular and leftist actors, many of whom suspected Ennahda of harboring
theocratic ambitions.70 This tension nearly derailed the constitution-drafting
process in 2013 after the assassinations of two leftist politicians, killings that
were claimed by an individual who later joined the Islamic State.71 As the most
prominent religious force in Tunisian politics, Ennahda was accused by its
detractors of abetting Salafi jihadism.72 This controversy eventually forced the
Troika government to resign, and Ennahda voluntarily ceded power to an
independent technocratic government.73
Notwithstanding these challenges, the NCA passed Tunisia’s first
democratic constitution in 2014, a document that contains several significant
concessions and compromises from Ennahda. These include leaving out a
reference to shari’a as a source of law in the constitution, abandoning attempts
to criminalize blasphemy in the constitution, and agreeing to protections for
women’s equality that are in many ways more progressive than the Personal
Status Code.74 The final constitution contains hardly any references to Islam,
other than affirming Tunisia’s Muslim identity.75
These concessions—which contravened many of Ennahda’s ideological
tenets—sparked internal disagreements that threatened to tear the party apart,76
foreshadowing future conflicts between the party’s pragmatic leadership and the
more dogmatic elements of its base. However, thanks to its organizational
discipline, Ennahda managed these external and internal pressures and ushered
the constitutional project to completion.77 This post-revolution period of
controversy and compromise is the most immediately relevant context for
Ennahda’s 2016 rebranding.
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Ennahda’s ideological evolution also bears the marked influence of Rached
Ghannouchi, the organization’s founder and longtime leader who spearheaded
its 2016 rebranding. Ghannouchi came of age under the Bourguiba regime as a
member of the social periphery.78 Initially enamored with Nasserist Arab
nationalism, he gravitated toward Islamic revival movements as he completed
his studies in Egypt, Syria, and France.79 Ghannouchi drew inspiration from the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood when he founded al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, which
often garners him the label “Islamist.” However, his ideological orientation
defies easy categorization: after growing critical of the Muslim Brotherhood,
Ghannouchi developed his own eclectic approach to theology and political
theory that has made Ennahda distinct among Muslim Brotherhood-inspired
movements.80
Al-Huriyyāt al-’Āmma fī-d-Dawla al-Islāmiyya (“Public Freedoms in the
Islamic State”) outlines Ghannouchi’s theory for “Islamic democracy,” his ideal
political system.81 This system entails the creation of an “Islamic state,” which
he defines as a government that uses shari’a as a basis for policy and
legislation.82 Ghannouchi maintains that such a state is necessary to realize the
purpose of Islam as a “comprehensive system” for governing human life in
accordance with divine law.83
However, unlike calls for an Islamic state made by other Muslim
Brotherhood-inspired groups, Ghannouchi’s understanding of the concept is
rooted in democracy and pluralism. Ghannouchi critiques Western liberal
democracy by distinguishing between its procedural and philosophical
components, arguing that while its procedures may be sound, its underlying
values are materialistic and corrupt, as evidenced by evils like colonialism.84
“Islamic democracy,” by contrast, would improve upon the Western model by
grounding democratic procedures in Islamic morality.85 Ghannouchi sees the
institutions of democracy—such as elections and separation of powers—as
mechanisms to implement shura, an Islamic concept which states that a ruler
should consult with the community on public affairs.86 For this reason,
Ghannouchi argues that the legitimacy of the Islamic state rests on popular
78
79
80
81
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consent.87 Moreover, such a state would ensure political pluralism through
ijtihād—the exercise of independent reasoning in interpreting Islamic sources—
since the public would choose freely between the interpretations offered by
different political actors.88
While Ghannouchi’s ideal of Islamic democracy facilitates life in
accordance with divine law, it assumes that citizens largely agree regarding what
constitutes a virtuous existence, leaving little room for moral pluralism.89
Accordingly, Ghannouchi himself acknowledges that his utopian vision may
never come to fruition.90 However, Ghannouchi’s rhetoric as a politician has
reflected a “pragmatic pluralist” counterpart to his Islamic democratic ideal,
which March calls “Muslim democracy.”91 This “non-ideal theory” similarly
seeks to promote a virtuous conception of life, “but one that can be subject to
the widest possible reasonable agreement.”92 In pursuit of such agreement,
Ghannouchi’s pragmatic vision affirms political pluralism, deemphasizes the
role of shari’a in politics, and prioritizes consensus-building over moral
perfectionism.93
These pragmatic pluralist elements have characterized Ennahda’s political
approach in recent years, evidencing Ghannouchi’s intellectual and strategic
influence on the organization. Ennahda’s rebranding as a “Muslim democratic”
party thus illustrates the interplay between Ghannouchi’s intellectual ideals and
his pragmatism as a politician.
C. Ennahda’s 2016 Rebranding
At its Tenth National Party Conference, Ennahda defined a new party
identity that rests on three components: Muslim democracy, a specialization in
politics, and an “Islamic reference.” In its Tenth Conference publications,
Ennahda rejects the label “political Islam,” asserting that this term no longer
accurately reflects the party’s identity or trajectory.94 Instead, it describes itself
as a party of “Muslim democrats,” meaning it sees no conflict between Islamic
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values and those of “modernity.”95 As part of this identity, Ennahda considers
itself a “national party” committed to placing national welfare, consensusbuilding, and the integrity of the constitutional order above partisan interests.96
Ennahda also seeks to become more professional, competent, and representative
of Tunisians’ priorities.97
Ennahda’s publications also announce its intention to “specialize” in
political affairs and leave other types of activism, including religious activism,
to civil society.98 This decision to abandon da’wa marks Ennahda’s commitment
to becoming a full-time political party, rather than splitting its time between
politics and preaching as it had done for decades.99 This change bars Ennahda
officials—who had long proselytized and preached at mosques—from
“simultaneously hold[ing] positions in the party” and in religious civil society
organizations.100
Despite this specialization in politics, Ennahda maintains its Muslim
character through the adoption of an “Islamic reference.”101 That is, while
Ennahda will not engage in preaching, it will still use Islam as a guide for its
approach, “translating” Islamic values into “political, social, economic, and
cultural” aspects of its program.102 The party stresses that it does not claim to
represent or speak for Islam in any way; rather, its Islamic reference is intended
to reflect the Muslim identity of its constituents.103
In addition to redefining the party’s identity, Ennahda outlines several policy
priorities in its conference documents. These include spearheading economic
recovery, inclusive development, anti-corruption, and counterterrorism efforts,
in addition to fleshing out Tunisia’s nascent democratic and constitutional
infrastructure to ensure good governance.104
D. Comparing Ennahda and An-Na’im
Comparing Ennahda’s articulated vision with that of An-Na’im reveals
considerable overlap. First, reflecting the role it played in drafting Tunisia’s
95
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constitution, Ennahda fully endorses democracy and constitutionalism in its
Tenth Conference statements, principles that also form the foundation for AnNa’im’s secular state framework. Moreover, Ennahda’s aspiration to engage
with ordinary Tunisians in accessible, non-religious terms—Ghannouchi
explains that Ennahda wants to talk to people about their “daily problems,” not
about “final judgement”—resembles An-Na’im’s conception of civic reason.105
Second, Ennahda appears to endorse a separation between religion and
political power, echoing An-Na’im’s principle of the religious neutrality of the
state. This is visible in the party’s rejection of “political Islam” and its
reassurances that Ennahda will never claim to speak for or represent Islam.
Ennahda similarly justifies its “specialization” decision by arguing that religious
reform is best achieved within a civil society space free from undue political
interference; this mirrors An-Na’im’s thesis that a secular state secures the
necessary space for negotiating shari’a in the public domain.
Third, like An-Na’im, Ennahda maintains that Islamic values should still
inform legislation and public policy even while religion is separated from
political power. This seems to be precisely the goal of the party’s “Islamic
reference.” In his opening speech at the conference, Ghannouchi reaffirms the
party’s desire to distance religion from “partisan utilization,” but stresses that
this should not “exclude religion from public life”; instead, he asserts that
Islamic values should inform public morality and state policy.106 This rhetoric
recalls An-Na’im’s vision for the connectedness of Islam and politics.
Identifying these parallels between the two visions allows us to better evaluate
where and how Ennahda might illustrate An-Na’im’s ideals in the Tunisian
context.
II. ENNAHDA’S EVOLUTION AND THE SAFEGUARDS OF A SECULAR STATE
A. An-Na’im’s Safeguards
In Islam and the Secular State, An-Na’im proposes constitutionalism,
human rights, and citizenship as an “integrated framework” for regulating “the
tension between the religious neutrality of the state and the connectedness of
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Islam and public policy.”107 These three interrelated “safeguards” mediate the
distinction between the state and politics by protecting the state from the tyranny
of a single group.108
Of An-Na’im’s three safeguards, constitutionalism represents the
overarching principle from which the other two follow. An-Na’im defines
“constitutional governance” as “the set of principles” that regulate the citizenstate relationship by curtailing government power “in accordance with the
fundamental rights of citizens and communities,” in addition to the rule of
law.109 “Constitutionalism” refers to the “institutions, processes, and broader
culture” necessary to maintain constitutional governance.110 An-Na’im’s
conception of constitutionalism rests on two main propositions. First, he defines
the term broadly, to encompass “complementary approaches” to “accountable
and responsible government” that might look different across contexts.111
Nevertheless, constitutionalism always serves to “uphold the rule of law, enforce
effective limitations on government powers, and protect human rights”; these
objectives are typically met through principles such as representative
government, the separation of powers, and an independent judiciary.112 Second,
An-Na’im advocates an iterative approach to constitutionalism in which the “end
of constitutional governance” is achieved “through practice and experience”
with constitutional principles in each context, rather than by implementing a
predetermined scheme.113
An-Na’im maintains that the protection of human rights is a necessary
component of constitutionalism.114 Notwithstanding the universality of these
rights as established through international legal obligations, on a practical level,
human rights are usually protected within a state context through their inclusion
in constitutional documents and practices.115 Regarding the relationship between
Islam and human rights, An-Na’im argues that shari’a principles essentially
conform to “most human rights norms,” save for a few specific aspects of “the
rights of women and non-Muslims and the freedom of religion and belief.”116
He proposes that these particular conflicts be resolved through Islamic legal
107
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reform—that is, by applying alternative interpretative methodologies to the
Qur’an and sunna.117 An-Na’im notes that a human rights framework also
provides Muslims the necessary political space to transform their human
understanding of shari’a in this manner.118
The two previous principles undergird An-Na’im’s argument in favor of
human rights-based citizenship. An-Na’im uses the term “citizenship” to
designate “a particular form of membership in the political community of a
territorial state in its global context.”119 Equal citizenship for all—regardless of
“religion, sex, ethnicity, language, or political opinion”—provides a “moral,
legal, and political basis” for people to claim and enjoy their human rights, both
at home and abroad.120 Accordingly, An-Na’im recommends that Muslims
engage in Islamic legal reform to facilitate a transition from a dhimma
conception of citizenship, which differentiates between individuals based on
their religious status, to a human rights-based conception.121
In his discussion of these three safeguards, An-Na’im aims to promote their
acceptance among Muslims.122 In this article, however, I am interested in a
different question: how might these safeguards influence the activity of
religiously inspired political parties? An-Na’im uses the term “Islamist politics”
to designate “political actors . . . who are pursuing an agenda that they believe
is mandated or required by their understanding and practice of Islam in general
or shari’a in particular.”123 While An-Na’im never explicitly addresses the
influence of his safeguards on Islamist politics, we can derive certain logical
implications from the arguments he makes regarding constitutionalism, human
rights, and citizenship.
An-Na’im’s writings suggest his proposed safeguards would ideally have a
constructive mediating—and/or moderating—influence on Islamist actors by
requiring them to compete in a regulated political arena. For instance, in an
article reflecting on the Arab Spring uprisings, An-Na’im argues that “Islamist”
forces “must be confronted and defeated” in “open contestation” with other
groups through the democratic process, rather than by their “suppression and
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exclusion” from “normal politics.”124 Furthermore, in his analysis of the early
evolution of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), An-Na’im
suggests that working within a secular system will change the AKP, even if the
party’s commitment to secular democracy is merely instrumental; eventually, he
predicts the party will pragmatically adapt to the secular system and recognize
its benefits.125
An-Na’im’s safeguards promote mediation and moderation in two ways.
First, by creating an open and inclusive political arena, they allow more groups
to exert influence on state institutions, thus reducing the risk that a single group
can seize control of those institutions.126 Second, by establishing “clear rules”
for political engagement, they encourage actors to compete in ways that respect
the autonomy and integrity of state institutions.127 Thus, by reducing Islamist
politics to “one of many” competing political actors in this manner, the state is
enabled to “manage the contradictions” between a secular normative politics and
a citizenry that derives political inspiration from religion.128
Another theory that can help assess how Islamist political parties grapple
with “the ideological challenges of participating in pluralistic politics” is Bayat’s
concept of post-Islamism.129 Bayat understands post-Islamism as the
“metamorphosis” of Islamism’s ideological content: a “shift in vision” that
represents “a discursive and/or pragmatic break . . . from an Islamist
paradigm.”130 In Bayat’s definition, the Islamist paradigm seeks to use state
power to establish some kind of “Islamic order.”131 Bayat describes postIslamism as “both a condition and a project.”132 First, it designates a “political
and social condition” in which Islamism’s appeal and legitimacy become
“exhausted,” forcing it to “reinvent itself.”133 Second, post-Islamism designates
a project, a “conscious attempt” by Islamist actors to “transcend” the Islamist
paradigm by harmonizing Islam with individual freedom, pluralism, democracy,
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and modernity.134 Overall, Bayat argues that post-Islamism is characterized by
a desire for “the secularization of the state” while “maintaining religious ethics
in society,”135 a combination that mirrors An-Na’im’s argument in Islam and the
Secular State. Accordingly, I apply Bayat’s conception of post-Islamism to
supplement An-Na’im’s theoretical framework as I explain Ennahda’s 2016
rebranding.
B. Ennahda’s Contingent Evolution
In their statements explaining Ennahda’s 2016 rebranding, Ghannouchi and
other party leaders highlight the fact that certain external conditions made the
party’s previous identity obsolete and motivated it to adopt a new one.136 In its
Tenth Conference publications, Ennahda emphasizes its acceptance of the 2014
constitution as an established framework that the party must now work within.137
This means that the party is committed to defending the institutions and
principles of constitutionalism, including the rule of law, governmental
oversight, and political pluralism.138 Notably, Ennahda’s leaders credit the
achievements of constitutionalism with permitting the party to abandon certain
aspects of its previous mission.139 For instance, Ghannouchi explains that
Ennahda’s original purpose was to promote expressions of religiosity that were
prohibited under Bourguibism;140 however, because the 2014 constitution
guarantees Tunisians’ rights to worship freely and “embrace an Arab Muslim
identity,” Ennahda “no longer needs” to defend religion.141 Party leader Said
Ferjani similarly notes that the passage of the constitution prompted Ennahda to
separate da’wa from its political activities, because “within a democratic
system,” civil society should be distinct from party politics.142 Moreover, Sayida
Ounissi, an Ennahda member of parliament, asserts that the constitution
“resolved” certain debates that had previously preoccupied Ennahda, such as the
“identity of the State,” “the relationship between religion and politics,” and “the
place of sharia in the hierarchy of norms.”143 This achievement allowed Ennahda
134
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to “finally” become a political party focused on a “practical agenda and
economic vision.”144
Ennahda’s leaders also cite its experience in government as an impetus for
its rebranding. After watching the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood fail in
government due to its lack of a coherent policy platform and its “ineptitude at
political bargaining,”145 Ennahda’s leadership has sought to avoid similar
tactical blunders. The party already had a good deal of experience bargaining
with its political rivals before it entered government in 2011, as exemplified by
its participation in the 18 October Coalition.146 However, Ounissi contends that
Ennahda’s “experiment with four years of actual political governance” has done
more to impact the party’s identity and discourse than “decades of underground
activity.”147 Ferjani goes so far as to validate the idea of post-Islamism as applied
to Ennahda after 2011, asserting that “Islamism ended . . . once Ennahdha
entered government and shared responsibility for social and economic provision
and became accountable” to constituents.148 Ounissi and Ferjani’s comments are
reflected in Ennahda’s compromises during the NCA deliberations, as well as
the party’s practical emphasis on professionalization: much of Ennahda’s Tenth
Conference dealt with administrative reforms intended to improve the party’s
capacity to “both design public policies and implement them,” helping it
compete in a pluralistic political arena.149
A last factor motivating Ennahda’s rebranding is a desire to distance the
party from violent extremism.150 A large part of the party’s decision to disavow
the label “political Islam” appears to have been the “negative connotations”
associated with this term in a regional environment marked by al-Qa’ida and the
Islamic State.151 Instead, the label “Muslim democrats,” which intentionally
recalls Europe’s Christian-Democratic parties, seemed the “easiest way” to
signal to skeptical outside observers, such as Tunisia’s secular and leftist actors
and Western governments, that Ennahda represents a “positive” phenomenon.152
While Ennahda’s rejection of Islamism certainly reflects a surface-level attempt
to improve the party’s reputation, it also has an ideological component:
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Ennahda’s leadership stresses that its moderate and pluralistic interpretation of
Islam and its endorsement of a “separation of mosque and state” do not reflect
the “black-and-white views” espoused by fundamentalists.153
C. Explaining Ennahda’s Rebranding
After considering the above explanations, it appears that Ennahda’s
rebranding does, at least to a certain extent, reflect the moderating influence of
An-Na’im’s safeguards. In particular, we might note Ennahda’s contributions
and subsequent commitment to Tunisia’s constitutional order. The statements
from Ennahda’s leadership about its rebranding indicate the party “adjusted to
the new rules of a game that it helped establish,” thus transforming “an external
constraint into a driver of change for the party’s ideology and identity.”154 For
this reason, the decisions Ennahda made during its Tenth Conference can be
understood as attempts to “adapt its identity to the realities of the new
constitution.”155 The influence of constitutionalism is similarly reflected by the
party’s emphatic endorsement of related principles, such as political pluralism,
the separation of religion and state, and human rights.156 The party’s actions and
statements at its Tenth Conference also reveal the influence of pluralistic
competition. Specifically, now that Ennahda is forced to compete for and share
power with other parties, the party clearly feels pressure to professionalize its
internal structures, broaden its appeal, and produce policy deliverables to more
effectively compete on a national stage. This sentiment is visible in Ennahda’s
declaration that it is becoming a “national party” which prioritizes the broader
national welfare over narrow party interests.157
Do these changes in Ennahda’s rhetoric and outlook constitute a “discursive
and/or pragmatic break” with the Islamist paradigm, in the words of Bayat?158
Certain commentators, including some Ennahda members, have affirmed that
Ennahda’s rebranding does indeed represent a post-Islamist turn.159 Others,
including Ghannouchi, maintain that the continuities in Ennahda’s ideology
trump the changes, as shown in his statement that Ennahda’s rebranding
“represents not so much a sea change as a ratification of long-held beliefs.”160 A
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more cynical version of this argument holds that Ennahda’s rebranding was
primarily cosmetic and instrumental. Wolf, for instance, asserts that Ennahda’s
decision to abandon “political Islam” was a predictable response to “the
conflation of Muslim Brotherhood organisations with the Islamic State or alQa’ida-type groups.”161
While some aspects of Ennahda’s 2016 rebranding were undoubtedly
superficial, the party has broken away from many aspects of its previous
paradigm since entering government in 2011, as evidenced by its many
concessions and compromises. For this reason, we may reasonably conclude that
An-Na’im’s safeguards—in addition to reputational concerns provoked by
violent extremism—were among the factors that motivated Ennahda’s
ideological revisions and rebranding. To be sure, it is overly simplistic to
characterize Ennahda’s evolution solely as “contingent pragmatism”—that is, as
a calibrated response to external conditions.162 Ennahda is not a monolith, and
its recent ideological revisions have not occurred without significant internal
dissent. Therefore, its process of evolution might be better described as a
“dialectical conversation” in which “political constraints” influence the party’s
trajectory, but the way these external influences are internalized depends on an
“ideological debate” within the party.163 Nevertheless, the outcome of this
dialectical process suggests that An-Na’im’s normative principles for regulating
the distinction between the state and politics can constructively shape Islamist
parties by encouraging them to adapt to a secular system and recognize its
benefits.
III. CULTURAL LEGITIMACY AND CIVIC REASON
A. Cultural Legitimacy
Another part of An-Na’im’s argument in Islam and the Secular State
concerns how political and civil society actors should advocate their positions
within a political arena regulated by the aforementioned structural and
procedural guardrails. An-Na’im recommends that actors employ two kinds of
argumentation—cultural legitimacy and civic reason—that serve his aims of
creating sustainable social change and fostering an inclusive discourse around
the role of Islam in public life.
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Cultural legitimacy is a theme present in virtually all of An-Na’im’s
scholarship, particularly his work on human rights implementation. While
human rights norms are typically regarded as universal, their adoption in local
contexts is always contingent upon their perceived validity within a given
society’s value framework.164 This is even more true in formerly colonized
societies, wherein the Western origins of the international human rights system
can provoke suspicions of cultural imperialism.165 In Islam and the Secular
State, An-Na’im applies similar reasoning to his calls for a secular state,
constitutionalism, human rights, and citizenship.166 As components of a
normative system typically associated with the West, these principles can never
be “culturally neutral.”167 Therefore, any “proponents of change” hoping to
advance these norms in their societies must be able to speak as cultural
“insiders” who can use “internally valid arguments to persuade the local
population.”168
Employing this strategy of cultural legitimacy can facilitate social change in
several ways. First, culturally legitimate arguments can help people understand
how a particular norm relates to their value system and daily life, which makes
persons more likely to respect and observe it.169 Second, culturally legitimate
arguments for social change may prove more convincing to “guardians of the
previous order” who are trying to resist change.170 Third, on the governmental
level, authorities are more likely to pass laws and policies that are perceived to
be in agreement with “ideal cultural norms and patterns of behavior,” rather than
endorsing nonconformity.171 For these reasons, An-Na’im recommends that his
proposals in Islam and the Secular State be promoted in a culturally legitimate
manner.
Furthermore, some scholars have identified a potential use for cultural
legitimacy in the context of Islamist politics, speculating whether certain
“Islamist” discourses, because of their religious and nationally-grounded
character, might be suited to advance norms like democracy and human rights
in Muslim-majority societies. For example, Hicks, noting that Islamist
movements and human rights organizations often share certain objectives by
164
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virtue of their common opposition to authoritarian regimes, asks whether
“Islamist human rights activism” might facilitate human rights
implementation.172 Roy similarly observes that state crackdowns on religious
activism, like what occurred in Tunisia, pushed “Islamist movements to protest
repression in the name of democracy” and to adopt the rhetoric of “human rights
and tolerance.”173 Thus, he claims that in Islamist movements’ criticisms of
authoritarianism, efforts to expand political participation, and alliances with
secular forces, these groups contribute to “laying the basis of greater democracy
and secularisation.”174 While An-Na’im does not address this aspect of cultural
legitimacy in Islam and the Secular State, I attempt to elucidate it through my
analysis of Ennahda, demonstrating how the party uses culturally legitimate
rhetoric to promote democracy, constitutionalism, and human rights.
Cultural legitimacy in the Tunisian context comprises several elements. One
relevant factor is the legacy of European colonialism and its relationship to
Muslim identity. An-Na’im describes the “postcolonial predicament” as the
“sense of profound ambiguity” experienced by former colonies as they attempt
to “reconcile contradictory histories and political visions” within the imbalanced
power relations of the postcolonial world.175 Many scholars argue that this
predicament in Muslim-majority societies has fueled an “Islamic resurgence”
since the mid-twentieth century.176 An-Na’im, for instance, views increased
demands for state enforcement of shari’a as “a misguided bid for postcolonial
self-determination.”177 Halverson and Greenberg similarly argue that the rise of
“Islamism” in the Maghreb region constitutes a “reassertion of Muslim identity
in pro-independence revolutionary terms” after the “humiliat[ion]” and
“deracinat[ion]” of European colonial rule.178
At the same time, there is a danger in relying on culturalist explanations for
the rise of social movements. Achcar contends that arguments like Halverson
and Greenberg’s rest on Orientalist foundations, such as the idea that Muslims
are primarily motivated by “cultural” or “religious” factors. This premise
underlies assertions that Muslim societies can only experience social upheaval
in religious terms and that movements advocating a “return to Islam” are in fact
172
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“progressive” responses to “Western cultural domination.”179 This idea,
however, problematically assumes that Islam is the “essential language and
culture of Muslim peoples” and emphasizes cultural and religious explanations
for change at the expense of socioeconomic ones.180 Such arguments also often
overlook the “reactionary” and “regressive” elements of many movements
advocating a return to Islam.181 These criticisms remind us that the “Islamic
resurgence” is not simply a natural expression of some repressed “Muslim
identity,” but rather the product of various complex factors. These include, but
are not limited to, efforts by Saudi Arabia and the United States to promote
Islamic fundamentalism as a counterweight to the political left, Western imperial
aggression, and neoliberal globalization.182
Thus, this conception of cultural legitimacy comprehends that the salience
of certain identity markers and the resonance of certain ideas in a particular local
context is not only dependent on culture, but also on specific material conditions.
In Tunisia, for instance, we might recall that al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya initially
drew its membership from a social periphery of individuals that had been
economically and politically—in addition to culturally—marginalized under the
Bourguiba regime.183 While these individuals mobilized around religious
identity, their participation in the Islamic movement reflected various
intersecting factors.
In addition to the salience of Islam as an identity marker, another aspect of
cultural legitimacy in Tunisia is the idea of Tunisian specificity or
exceptionalism, or tunisianité.184 This concept has a variety of meanings but is
broadly rooted in Tunisia’s historical experiences with Phoenician, Amazigh,
and Ottoman rule, its location at the crossroads of Europe and Africa, and its
distinct brand of Islam heavily influenced by the intellectual production of alZaytouna Mosque in Tunis.185 For the purposes of this article, I focus on
tunisianité as it relates to Tunisia’s political and religious reformism, which can
be traced back to the nineteenth century.186
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During the nineteenth century, Tunisia’s Husaynid rulers instituted several
profound political reforms.187 The most significant of these was an 1864
constitution that is widely believed to be “the first of its kind in the Muslim
world” to restrict government power and protect freedom of religion and the
legal equality of all citizens.188 These modernization efforts existed
symbiotically with a reform-minded Islamic thinking that found a home at alZaytouna. This reformist approach called for exercising ijtihād in order to adapt
shari’a to the times.189 It is epitomized by the work of al-Zaytouna scholars such
as Mohamed Tahar Ben Achour, whose rationalistic approach to exegesis
prioritized a consideration of maqāsid al-shari’a—the “objectives, or ends, of
Islamic law”—over a literalist reading of the Qur’an and sunna, and Tahar
Haddad, whose pioneering arguments for women’s rights laid the foundations
for Bourguiba’s Personal Status Code.190 Bourguiba, and later, Ben Ali, invoked
tunisianité to bolster their authority by deliberately portraying their
modernization policies as a continuation of Tunisia’s indigenous legacy of
Islamic reform,191 demonstrating the relevance of tunisianité as a source of
cultural legitimacy.
Cultural legitimacy represents a core strength of Ennahda’s political
approach. The party has always attempted to present a culturally-grounded
discourse by appealing to Islam as an identity marker for Tunisians: Hmida
Ennaifer, one of the founders of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, recalls that the group’s
Islamic revivalism initially sought to ameliorate a “crisis of identity”
experienced by Tunisians under the Bourguiba regime.192 These questions of
identity remain salient in contemporary Tunisian politics. For example, Wolf
observes that while the 2011 uprisings “took place in response to economic
hardship and political repression,” deliberations in the NCA “quickly centred on
identity topics, particularly the role of Islam in society.”193 The final
constitution, while omitting any references to shari’a, did affirm Tunisia’s Arab
Muslim identity in a clause that was championed by Ennahda. Moreover, while
Ennahda’s 2016 rebranding has been understood by some as “de-emphasizing”
the place of Islam within the party,194 one could argue that the “specialization”
decision and “Islamic reference” focus on retaining Islam as an identity marker
187
188
189
190
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exclusively—that is, discarding it as a comprehensive political ideology but
keeping its symbolic and cultural resonance.
Ennahda has also long invoked the idea of Tunisian specificity to position
its ideology as culturally legitimate. When they founded al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya,
Ghannouchi and his collaborators wanted their group “to be perceived as the
inheritors . . . of the nineteenth-century Tunisian reform movement” so that their
ideas would appear “indigenous and deeply rooted in a legacy the Tunisians
respected.”195 This is one of the reasons why the group ended up moving away
from the MB-linked thinkers, like al-Banna and Qutb, that had initially
influenced their ideology, and, instead, began drawing inspiration from
rationalistic al-Zaytouna thinkers like Tahar Ben Achour and Haddad, whose
ideas they considered better suited to the Tunisian context.196
The party demonstrates its continued appeals to Tunisian exceptionalism in
its statements from its Tenth Conference. For example, Ghannouchi’s opening
speech addresses Tunisians as “children of Carthage” and the inheritors of a
legacy shaped by figures from Hannibal and Ibn Khaldun to Tahar Haddad and
Habib Bourguiba.197 These appeals to tunisianité are why Ounissi claims that
Ennahda is more accurately described as “Bourguiba’s illegitimate child” than
the “Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood.”198 In essence, while Bourguiba may have
been the “secular interpreter” of “Tunisian modernity and reformism,” Ennahda
has positioned itself as the religious interpreter of this heritage.199
Moreover, Ennahda has used culturally legitimate rhetoric to advance the
norms outlined by An-Na’im in Islam and the Secular State. First, from an
intellectual standpoint, a primary goal of the founders of Tunisia’s Islamic
movement—especially Ghannouchi—has been to promote social and political
reform in a culturally legitimate manner.200 As a young activist, Ghannouchi
admired Tunisia’s nineteenth century reform movement for “learning and
borrowing from Western civilization” while respecting Tunisia’s “Arab-Islamic
identity” and sought to accomplish the same, “reform[ing] the country” with
“modern tools and techniques but within an Islamic framework.”201 This is the
spirit of his argument in al-Hurriyat al-’Amma fi-d-Dawla al-Islamiyya, which
explains how Western liberal democracy can be stripped of its culturally foreign
195
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198
199
200
201

TAMIMI, supra note 45, at 39.
TAMIMI, supra note 45; Ghannouchi, supra note 140; Ounissi, supra note 144.
Ghannouchi, supra note 108.
Ounissi, supra note 144, at 2.
Cavatorta & Merone, supra note 130, at 37.
TAMIMI, supra note 45.
TAMIMI, supra note 45, at 40.

SCOTT_8.17.22

804

8/21/2022 2:29 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

aspects and internalized within an Islamic context.202 Ghannouchi’s culturally
legitimate justifications for democracy are also visible in his statements at the
Tenth Conference, like his comment that “Ennahda is run by institutions, by
democracy, by consultation—an important Islamic value.”203
Furthermore, after enduring regime repression in the 1980s and 1990s,
Ennahda adopted a civil and political rights discourse grounded in references to
Islamic principles and tunisianité.204 This discourse maintains that the objectives
of Islam are “justice and liberty for all,” which makes authoritarianism—
including the imposition of shari’a—contrary to Islam.205 Ghannouchi has used
a similar logic to endorse the universality of human rights, maintaining that
because God intended Islam to “realize human interests and welfare,” anything
that accomplishes this goal is “part of Islam,” even if it lacks “textual grounding
. . . in revelation.”206 Moreover, Ghannouchi justifies Ennahda’s support for the
2014 constitution’s provisions on gender equality by referencing tunisianité,
explaining that women’s rights “are nowadays part of the Tunisian identity,” so
“Tunisian Islamists try to adapt Islam to [this] Tunisian reality.”207
While some of these statements might reflect rhetorical maneuvering rather
than a deep commitment to human rights, they nevertheless confirm Ennahda’s
use of culturally legitimate argumentation to defend the principles that form the
basis of An-Na’im’s secular state framework. This suggests that, at least in the
Tunisian context, Ennahda’s religion-inspired discourse has the potential to
advance An-Na’im’s vision.
B. Civic Reason
Despite Ennahda’s use of culturally legitimate augmentation, the power of
Ennahda’s appeals to cultural legitimacy might be muted by its use of another
kind of argumentation recommended by An-Na’im: civic reason. Civic reason
requires that when actors “seek to influence public policy and/or legislation,”
they do so using a rationale that is “accessible to all” citizens.208 This means that
religious actors cannot employ “claims of religious exclusivity” that are
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“dependent on religious belief.”209 For example, if a Muslim individual
advocates prohibiting interest on loans simply because it is forbidden by Islam,
this leaves “nothing to discuss with other citizens,” who can only accept or reject
this policy proposal on the grounds of religious belief.210 Instead, An-Na’im
recommends that Muslims “reflect on the social rationale” for shari’a injunctions
and attempt to “persuade others of the general good of those commandments.”211
Thus, the use of civic reason creates an inclusive “public arena where nonstate
actors can compete” freely and fairly “to influence state policy” by ensuring that
when religious principles inform political debate, they do so in a manner that
encourages persuasion, negotiation, and compromise instead of “mutual
assertion of religious dogma.”212
Civic reason could be said to characterize some of the more pragmatic
aspects of Ennahda’s political approach. For example, Ghannouchi’s “non-ideal
theory” of “Muslim democracy” similarly seeks to create an inclusive public
arena by “privileg[ing] the attainment of actual agreement” in political debates
over the pursuit of religious ideals.213 Ghannouchi’s pragmatic conception of
consensus-building recognizes that while some policy proposals may have
Islamic justifications, they can also be advocated with reasons that “might appeal
to anyone.”214 For instance, while Ghannouchi defended Tunisia’s 2014
constitution on religious grounds, he also advocated for its adoption by
appealing to democracy, human rights, and popular sovereignty as “human
values.”215 While not all Ennahda members may agree with Ghanouchi’s
pragmatism, his approach—which seeks to appeal to “all segments of society”
by presenting Ennahda’s ideological project in a programmatic way—has
defined Ennahda’s post-revolution strategy.216
This pursuit of consensus has also involved sidestepping “ideologically
loaded” issues that are likely to alienate Ennahda’s secular allies or prove
divisive among Tunisians.217 For example, since 2011, Ennahda has
intentionally moved in a centrist direction and downplayed its religious rhetoric
in its election campaigns.218 This is seen in the policy platform announced at its
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Id. at 93.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 92, 96.
MARCH, supra note 90, at 3, 4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4.
Interview with Habib Ellouze, supra note 147.
Meddeb, supra note 48, at 10.
Interview with Habib Ellouze, supra note 147.

SCOTT_8.17.22

806

8/21/2022 2:29 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

Tenth Conference, which hardly contains any religious elements.219 While these
moves may have disappointed some of the party’s more dogmatic members,
from an external viewpoint the decisions of Ennahda’s leadership to forego
religiously exclusive policy demands accord with the spirit of civic reason.
Ennahda’s use of civic reason may exist in tension with its 2016 decision to
maintain Islam as a “reference” and identity marker, highlighting a potential
contradiction inherent in An-Na’im’s theory. El Amine identifies this tension
when she asks how “specifically religious arguments” are supposed to contribute
to politics and public policy in a public sphere regulated by civic reason.220 At
its Tenth Conference, Ennahda stated that it intended to “translate” its Islamic
reference into specific outcomes.221 However, since then, the party has not
offered any sort of roadmap for how it will “translat[e] Islamic values into
concrete policies at the political, economic, and social level.”222
To be sure, Ennahda has put forward concrete policy proposals during its
time in government—much of its Tenth Conference was dedicated to outlining
the party’s policy platform—but it is not immediately clear what makes
Ennahda’s approach distinctively “Islamic.” Not much distinguishes its 2016
policy priorities—such as good governance, economic development, and
counterterrorism—from the priorities of any generic center-right party.223 While
this sort of uncontroversial policy menu might satisfy the requirements of civic
reason and a consensus-based approach to politics, it does little to convincingly
demonstrate the distinctiveness of Ennahda’s Islamic reference. Therefore, in
the case of political parties like Ennahda that seek to use Islamic values to inform
legislation and public policy, An-Na’im’s concept of civic reason poses a
potentially insurmountable challenge—the more that these parties abandon
specifically religious arguments, the more they risk losing the identity that
initially made their message distinctive and/or culturally legitimate. In
Ennahda’s case, the tension between maintaining its Islamic identity and
broadening its appeal threatens to limit the party’s practical effectiveness and
“neutraliz[e] it as a driver of social change.”224
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CONCLUSION
This Article sought to analyze Ennahda’s 2016 rebranding as a party of
“Muslim democrats” through the lens of Islam and the Secular State by
determining the extent to which the party’s evolution reflects the influence—
and contributes to the establishment—of the conditions in An-Na’im’s
framework. First, I have endeavored to clarify what the “successful”
implementation of An-Na’im’s proposals might mean in relation to “Islamist
politics,” a question that is not substantively addressed in Islam and the Secular
State. Specifically, I argued that An-Na’im’s “safeguards” can have a
moderating influence on Islamist political parties by pushing them to adapt to a
secular state system, a phenomenon that is illustrated by Ennahda’s evolution.
Moreover, I argued that political discourses like Ennahda’s, which are grounded
in religious and cultural references, can serve to advance An-Na’im’s normative
principles through culturally legitimate arguments. However, my analysis of
Ennahda has also highlighted a potential pitfall regarding the political role of
Islam in An-Na’im’s theory, which is that discouraging religiously-specific
arguments in the name of civic reason might serve to undermine what is
distinctive—and effective—about the approach of Islamist political parties.
This last point holds profound implications for the future of Ennahda and
Tunisia’s democratic transition. Though Ennahda has its fair share of detractors,
it is difficult to understate the instrumental role the party played in bringing
about Tunisia’s democratic transition and constitutional framework. Throughout
this process, it showed a remarkable ability to adapt to a “more plural and
inclusive environment,” an evolution exemplified by its 2016 rebranding.225
However, the very characteristics that have contributed to Ennahda’s success
within a secular state framework—such as pragmatism, ideological flexibility,
and a willingness to compromise—have complicated the party’s relationship
with its grassroots supporters and with Tunisian voters more generally. Habib
Ellouze, a member of the party’s more conservative wing, judges that Ennahda’s
attempts to moderate and downplay its Islamic identity have caused it to lose
part of its follower base.226 Other observers worry that Ennahda’s decision to
abandon political Islam has opened up space for more fundamentalist Salafi
movements.227 Additionally, Ennahda’s willingness to compromise with and
grant amnesty to figures from the Ben Ali regime—many of whom reentered
post-revolution politics as members of the Nidaa Tounes party—has alienated
225
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many of its grassroots supporters, who valued the party’s commitments to
anticorruption and social justice.228
Most significantly, while Ennahda’s moderate political approach may have
helped secure democratic and constitutional freedoms for Tunisians, the party
has largely failed to ameliorate economic ills like poverty, corruption, and
unemployment during its time in government.229 As one observer puts it, you
“can’t eat” freedom of expression.230 Indeed, Wolf argues that Ennahda’s 2016
rebranding—and the overall cautiousness of its political strategy—reflect
“consensus for the sake of survival” because the party lacks a “credible socioeconomic reform programme.”231
Because Ennahda has few socioeconomic achievements to show for its years
in government, many Tunisians today view the party as the epitome of “bad
governance and corruption.”232 This perception is a major factor in the political
crisis currently plaguing Tunisia: Ennahda has been the target of widespread
popular anger for its perceived mishandling of the Covid-19 pandemic and
accompanying economic crisis, which prompted the country’s president, Kais
Saied, to invoke emergency powers and suspend Tunisia’s parliament on July
25, 2021.233 While it is unclear how this crisis—which many observers are
labeling a coup—will play out, it underscores the fundamental fragility of
democratic transitions like Tunisia’s.234 It also recalls An-Na’im’s point that the
practical implementation of principles like secularism, human rights, and
constitutionalism is both iterative and deeply contextual, subject to setbacks and
revision as actors negotiate what these principles mean in their own societies.235
Thus, this latest chapter of Tunisia’s democratic transition is likely to illustrate
the continued relevance of the principles in An-Na’im’s work, and Ennahda’s
role in negotiating them.
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